# Multi-tenancy and product editions

xly is a multi-tenant SaaS. The same codebase, the same database schema,
the same metadata serve many customers. The framework enforces tenancy
through three independent axes, applied at different layers.

For the *worked example* of how this plays out for a real module, see
[Slice 2](../slices/02-multi-tenancy.md). This page is the canonical
two-paragraph summary you can link from anywhere.

## The three axes

| Axis | Carried in | Granularity | Source of truth |
|---|---|---|---|
| **`sBrandsId`** (加工商ID) | almost every business row | per-row | the user's session (`UserInfo.getsBrandsId()`) |
| **`sSubsidiaryId`** (子公司ID) | almost every business row | per-row | the user's session |
| **`sVersionFlowId`** (版本流程ID) | `gdsmodule` only | per-module | the user's edition (against `sisversionflow`) |

Per-row scoping is universal across business-data tables: both
`sBrandsId` and `sSubsidiaryId` appear on essentially every one. Most
framework-metadata tables also carry the columns, but four of them
(`gdsformconst`, `gdsmodule`, `gdsconfigformmaster`, `gdsconfigformslave`)
are an explicit exception — `BusinessBaseServiceImpl.sTableNameList`
(lines 162-169) lists them as "不需要公司子公司的表" and lines 1078-1084
strip `sBrandsId`/`sSubsidiaryId` from the write payload for those
tables. In practice they hold a single sentinel tenant value shared
across all customers. Convention: "if a row represents tenant-owned
state, both columns are present *and populated from the session*."

Per-module gating (`sVersionFlowId`) is the opposite — it lives on
`gdsmodule` only. So edition gating is a one-time filter at module-
discovery time, not a per-row check.

## How it's enforced

Every authenticated REST endpoint runs the same line right after the
request arrives:

```java
RequestAddParamUtil.me().addParams(params, userInfo);
```

— see `xlyPersist/.../RequestAddParamUtil.java`. This 56-line utility
pulls the user's identity out of `UserInfo` and writes 16 keys into the
request `params` map (`sBrandsId`, `sSubsidiaryId`, `sBrId`, `sSuId`,
`sLoginId`, `sIpAddress`, `sComputeName`, `sUserId`, `userId`,
`sLanguage`, `sUserType`, `sUserName`, `sMakePerson`, `sTeamId`,
`sMachineId`, plus `CURRENT_USER_LOGIN_TYPE`). xlyApi ships its own
near-identical 57-line copy at `xlyApi/.../api/util/RequestAddParamUtil.java`.
Every downstream MyBatis query that references
`#{sBrandsId}` and `#{sSubsidiaryId}` is automatically scoped. The
frontend cannot influence these — they come from the server-side session
via the `@CurrentUser` argument resolver.

## Failure modes

A query that *forgets* to filter by `sBrandsId` returns rows from every
tenant. That's the catastrophic data-leak case. Three places to watch:

1. **Stored procedures** that compose dynamic SQL at runtime — the
   developer must remember to inject `sBrandsId`. The codebase does
   this consistently but not enforceably.
2. **Database views.** Almost all `viw_*` views select tenant columns
   from their primary base table, but a hand-rolled view that omits
   them is a per-row leak. A maintainer audit script that flags such
   views is a useful tool.
3. **The save endpoint** (`addUpdateDelBusinessData`), which lets the
   frontend supply `sTable` directly in the payload. If the runtime
   doesn't validate the supplied table against the form's authorised
   tables, this is a privilege-escalation surface. See [Slice 1](../slices/01-hello-world.md#4-user-edits-a-row-clicks-save).

## How the design scales

The framework's multi-tenancy design scales by **row count**, not by
code. A small SaaS deployment with one brand and one subsidiary uses
exactly the same Java, MyBatis mappers, and stored procedures as a
deployment with dozens of brands × dozens of subsidiaries × several
editions; only the row distributions in `gdsmodule`, `sisversionflow`,
and the business-data tables differ.