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Adds self-introspection of the framework's REST surface via springdoc-openapi. Every @RestController method in the host application is now documented in a machine-readable OpenAPI 3 spec at /v3/api-docs and rendered for humans at /swagger-ui/index.html. This is the first step toward: - R1 (web SPA): OpenAPI codegen feeds a typed TypeScript client - A1 (MCP server): discoverable tool catalog - Operator debugging: browsable "what can this instance do" page **Dependency.** New `springdoc-openapi-starter-webmvc-ui` 2.6.0 added to platform-bootstrap (not distribution) because it ships @Configuration classes that need to run inside a full Spring Boot application context AND brings a Swagger UI WebJar. platform-bootstrap is the only module with a @SpringBootApplication anyway; pbc modules never depend on it, so plug-in classloaders stay clean and the OpenAPI scanner only sees host controllers. **Configuration.** New `OpenApiConfiguration` @Configuration in platform-bootstrap provides a single @Bean OpenAPI: - Title "vibe_erp", version v0.28.0 (hardcoded; moves to a build property when a real version header ships) - Description with a framework-level intro explaining the bearer-JWT auth model, the permission whitelist, and the fact that plug-in endpoints under /api/v1/plugins/{id}/** are NOT scanned (they are dynamically registered via PluginContext.endpoints on a single dispatcher controller; a future chunk may extend the spec at runtime). - One relative server entry ("/") so the spec works behind a reverse proxy without baking localhost into it. - bearerAuth security scheme (HTTP/bearer/JWT) applied globally via addSecurityItem, so every operation in the rendered UI shows a lock icon and the "Authorize" button accepts a raw JWT (Swagger adds the "Bearer " prefix itself). **Security whitelist.** SecurityConfiguration now permits three additional path patterns without authentication: - /v3/api-docs/** — the generated JSON spec - /swagger-ui/** — the Swagger UI static assets + index - /swagger-ui.html — the legacy path (redirects to the above) The data still requires a valid JWT: an unauthenticated "Try it out" call from the Swagger UI against a pbc endpoint returns 401 exactly like a curl would. **Why not wire this into every PBC controller with @Operation / @Parameter annotations in this chunk:** springdoc already auto-generates the full path + request body + response schema from reflection. Adding hand-written annotations is scope creep — a future chunk can tag per-operation @Operation(security = ...) to surface the @RequirePermission keys once a consumer actually needs them. **Smoke-tested end-to-end against real Postgres:** - GET /v3/api-docs returns 200 with 64680 bytes of OpenAPI JSON - 76 total paths listed across every PBC controller - All v3 production paths present: /work-orders/shop-floor, /work-orders/{id}/operations/{operationId}/start + /complete, /work-orders/{id}/{start,complete,cancel,scrap} - components.securitySchemes includes bearerAuth (type=http, format=JWT) - GET /swagger-ui/index.html returns 200 with the Swagger HTML bundle (5 swagger markers found in the HTML) - GET /swagger-ui.html (legacy path) returns 200 after redirect 25 modules (unchanged count — new config lives inside platform-bootstrap), 355 unit tests, all green.
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Implements the auth unit from the implementation plan. Until now, the framework let any caller hit any endpoint; with the single-tenant refactor there is no second wall, so auth was the most pressing gap. What landed: * New `platform-security` module owns the framework's security primitives (JWT issuer/verifier, password encoder, Spring Security filter chain config, AuthenticationFailedException). Lives between platform-persistence and platform-bootstrap. * `JwtIssuer` mints HS256-signed access (15min) and refresh (7d) tokens via NimbusJwtEncoder. `JwtVerifier` decodes them back to a typed `DecodedToken` so PBCs never need to import OAuth2 types. JWT secret is read from VIBEERP_JWT_SECRET; the framework refuses to start if the secret is shorter than 32 bytes. * `SecurityConfiguration` wires Spring Security with JWT resource server, stateless sessions, CSRF disabled, and a public allowlist for /actuator/health, /actuator/info, /api/v1/_meta/**, /api/v1/auth/login, /api/v1/auth/refresh. * `PrincipalContext` (in platform-persistence/security) is the bridge between Spring Security's SecurityContextHolder and the audit listener. Bound by `PrincipalContextFilter` which runs AFTER BearerTokenAuthenticationFilter so SecurityContextHolder is fully populated. The audit listener (AuditedJpaEntityListener) now reads from PrincipalContext, so created_by/updated_by are real user ids instead of __system__. * `pbc-identity` gains `UserCredential` (separate table from User — password hashes never share a query plan with user records), `AuthService` (login + refresh, generic AuthenticationFailedException on every failure to thwart account enumeration), and `AuthController` exposing /api/v1/auth/login and /api/v1/auth/refresh. * `BootstrapAdminInitializer` runs on first boot of an empty identity__user table, creates an `admin` user with a random 16-char password printed to the application logs. Subsequent boots see the user exists and skip silently. * GlobalExceptionHandler maps AuthenticationFailedException → 401 with a generic "invalid credentials" body (RFC 7807 ProblemDetail). * New module also brings BouncyCastle as a runtime-only dep (Argon2PasswordEncoder needs it). Tests: 38 unit tests pass, including JwtRoundTripTest (issue/decode round trip + tamper detection + secret-length validation), PrincipalContextTest (ThreadLocal lifecycle), AuthServiceTest (9 cases covering login + refresh happy paths and every failure mode). End-to-end smoke test against a fresh Postgres via docker-compose: GET /api/v1/identity/users (no auth) → 401 POST /api/v1/auth/login (admin + bootstrap) → 200 + access/refresh POST /api/v1/auth/login (wrong password) → 401 GET /api/v1/identity/users (Bearer) → 200, lists admin POST /api/v1/identity/users (Bearer) → 201, creates alice alice.created_by → admin's user UUID POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (refresh token) → 200 + new pair POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (access token) → 401 (type mismatch) GET /api/v1/identity/users (garbage token) → 401 GET /api/v1/_meta/info (no auth, public) → 200 Plan: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-07-vibe-erp-implementation-plan.md refreshed to drop the now-dead P1.1 (RLS hook) and H1 (per-region tenant routing), reorder priorities so P4.1 is first, and reflect the single-tenant change throughout. Bug fixes encountered along the way (caught by the smoke test, not by unit tests — the value of running real workflows): • JwtIssuer was producing IssuedToken.expiresAt with nanosecond precision but JWT exp is integer seconds; the round-trip test failed equality. Fixed by truncating to ChronoUnit.SECONDS at issue time. • PrincipalContextFilter was registered with addFilterAfter UsernamePasswordAuthenticationFilter, which runs BEFORE the OAuth2 BearerTokenAuthenticationFilter, so SecurityContextHolder was empty when the bridge filter read it. Result: every authenticated request still wrote __system__ in audit columns. Fixed by addFilterAfter BearerTokenAuthenticationFilter::class. • RefreshRequest is a single-String data class. jackson-module-kotlin interprets single-arg data classes as delegate-based creators, so Jackson tried to deserialize the entire JSON object as a String and threw HttpMessageNotReadableException. Fixed by adding @JsonCreator(mode = PROPERTIES) + @param:JsonProperty. -
Design change: vibe_erp deliberately does NOT support multiple companies in one process. Each running instance serves exactly one company against an isolated Postgres database. Hosting many customers means provisioning many independent instances, not multiplexing them. Why: most ERP/EBC customers will not accept a SaaS where their data shares a database with other companies. The single-tenant-per-instance model is what the user actually wants the product to look like, and it dramatically simplifies the framework. What changed: - CLAUDE.md guardrail #5 rewritten from "multi-tenant from day one" to "single-tenant per instance, isolated database" - api.v1: removed TenantId value class entirely; removed tenantId from Entity, AuditedEntity, Principal, DomainEvent, RequestContext, TaskContext, IdentityApi.UserRef, Repository - platform-persistence: deleted TenantContext, HibernateTenantResolver, TenantAwareJpaTransactionManager, TenancyJpaConfiguration; removed @TenantId and tenant_id column from AuditedJpaEntity - platform-bootstrap: deleted TenantResolutionFilter; dropped vibeerp.instance.mode and default-tenant from properties; added vibeerp.instance.company-name; added VibeErpApplication @EnableJpaRepositories and @EntityScan so PBC repositories outside the main package are wired; added GlobalExceptionHandler that maps IllegalArgumentException → 400 and NoSuchElementException → 404 (RFC 7807 ProblemDetail) - pbc-identity: removed tenant_id from User, repository, controller, DTOs, IdentityApiAdapter; updated UserService duplicate-username message and the matching test - distribution: dropped multiTenancy=DISCRIMINATOR and tenant_identifier_resolver from application.yaml; configured Spring Boot mainClass on the springBoot extension (not just bootJar) so bootRun works - Liquibase: rewrote platform-init changelog to drop platform__tenant and the tenant_id columns on every metadata__* table; rewrote pbc-identity init to drop tenant_id columns, the (tenant_id, *) composite indexes, and the per-table RLS policies - IdentifiersTest replaced with Id<T> tests since the TenantId tests no longer apply Verified end-to-end against a real Postgres via docker-compose: POST /api/v1/identity/users → 201 Created GET /api/v1/identity/users → list works GET /api/v1/identity/users/X → fetch by id works POST duplicate username → 400 Bad Request (was 500) PATCH bogus id → 404 Not Found (was 500) PATCH alice → 200 OK DELETE alice → 204, alice now disabled All 18 unit tests pass.
