• Implements the auth unit from the implementation plan. Until now, the
    framework let any caller hit any endpoint; with the single-tenant
    refactor there is no second wall, so auth was the most pressing gap.
    
    What landed:
    
    * New `platform-security` module owns the framework's security
      primitives (JWT issuer/verifier, password encoder, Spring Security
      filter chain config, AuthenticationFailedException). Lives between
      platform-persistence and platform-bootstrap.
    
    * `JwtIssuer` mints HS256-signed access (15min) and refresh (7d) tokens
      via NimbusJwtEncoder. `JwtVerifier` decodes them back to a typed
      `DecodedToken` so PBCs never need to import OAuth2 types. JWT secret
      is read from VIBEERP_JWT_SECRET; the framework refuses to start if
      the secret is shorter than 32 bytes.
    
    * `SecurityConfiguration` wires Spring Security with JWT resource
      server, stateless sessions, CSRF disabled, and a public allowlist
      for /actuator/health, /actuator/info, /api/v1/_meta/**,
      /api/v1/auth/login, /api/v1/auth/refresh.
    
    * `PrincipalContext` (in platform-persistence/security) is the bridge
      between Spring Security's SecurityContextHolder and the audit
      listener. Bound by `PrincipalContextFilter` which runs AFTER
      BearerTokenAuthenticationFilter so SecurityContextHolder is fully
      populated. The audit listener (AuditedJpaEntityListener) now reads
      from PrincipalContext, so created_by/updated_by are real user ids
      instead of __system__.
    
    * `pbc-identity` gains `UserCredential` (separate table from User —
      password hashes never share a query plan with user records),
      `AuthService` (login + refresh, generic AuthenticationFailedException
      on every failure to thwart account enumeration), and `AuthController`
      exposing /api/v1/auth/login and /api/v1/auth/refresh.
    
    * `BootstrapAdminInitializer` runs on first boot of an empty
      identity__user table, creates an `admin` user with a random
      16-char password printed to the application logs. Subsequent
      boots see the user exists and skip silently.
    
    * GlobalExceptionHandler maps AuthenticationFailedException → 401
      with a generic "invalid credentials" body (RFC 7807 ProblemDetail).
    
    * New module also brings BouncyCastle as a runtime-only dep
      (Argon2PasswordEncoder needs it).
    
    Tests: 38 unit tests pass, including JwtRoundTripTest (issue/decode
    round trip + tamper detection + secret-length validation),
    PrincipalContextTest (ThreadLocal lifecycle), AuthServiceTest (9 cases
    covering login + refresh happy paths and every failure mode).
    
    End-to-end smoke test against a fresh Postgres via docker-compose:
      GET /api/v1/identity/users (no auth)        → 401
      POST /api/v1/auth/login (admin + bootstrap) → 200 + access/refresh
      POST /api/v1/auth/login (wrong password)    → 401
      GET  /api/v1/identity/users (Bearer)        → 200, lists admin
      POST /api/v1/identity/users (Bearer)        → 201, creates alice
      alice.created_by                            → admin's user UUID
      POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (refresh token)   → 200 + new pair
      POST /api/v1/auth/refresh (access token)    → 401 (type mismatch)
      GET  /api/v1/identity/users (garbage token) → 401
      GET  /api/v1/_meta/info (no auth, public)   → 200
    
    Plan: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-07-vibe-erp-implementation-plan.md
    refreshed to drop the now-dead P1.1 (RLS hook) and H1 (per-region
    tenant routing), reorder priorities so P4.1 is first, and reflect the
    single-tenant change throughout.
    
    Bug fixes encountered along the way (caught by the smoke test, not by
    unit tests — the value of running real workflows):
    
      • JwtIssuer was producing IssuedToken.expiresAt with nanosecond
        precision but JWT exp is integer seconds; the round-trip test
        failed equality. Fixed by truncating to ChronoUnit.SECONDS at
        issue time.
      • PrincipalContextFilter was registered with addFilterAfter
        UsernamePasswordAuthenticationFilter, which runs BEFORE the
        OAuth2 BearerTokenAuthenticationFilter, so SecurityContextHolder
        was empty when the bridge filter read it. Result: every
        authenticated request still wrote __system__ in audit columns.
        Fixed by addFilterAfter BearerTokenAuthenticationFilter::class.
      • RefreshRequest is a single-String data class. jackson-module-kotlin
        interprets single-arg data classes as delegate-based creators, so
        Jackson tried to deserialize the entire JSON object as a String
        and threw HttpMessageNotReadableException. Fixed by adding
        @JsonCreator(mode = PROPERTIES) + @param:JsonProperty.
    vibe_erp authored
     
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  • …tation plan, updated CLAUDE.md
    vibe_erp authored
     
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