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…ormCollect + Skills + KgSearch - AgentIdentity + AgentFactory: build agent per request with token+form-allowlist carried in tool instances (per-call context; robust vs LC4j callback threading) - ErpClient: token-aware read/write/examine; user-token expiry does NOT silently re-login as dev-admin (no privilege escalation) - AuthzService: devIdentity()/userIdentity() resolve granted-form set (sAuthsId) - proposeExamine tool + OpController examine dispatch + forward user Authorization on confirm - InteractionTool.askUser (structured options), FormCollectTool.collectForm (real gdsconfigformslave schema) - SkillService + SkillTool.loadSkill + ai_skill digest in system prompt - KgQueryTool.kgSearch: L2 neighbors/flow + L3 field->table - tools ErpReadTool/ProposeWriteTool/QueryTool/FormCollectTool now per-request (not @Component)
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- AuthzService: form-level allowlist ported from backend getsAuthsIdNew (sysjurisdiction sKey set); sysadmin=all; wired into Read/lookupRecord/proposeUpdate/proposeDelete (admin dev-login => all-access; enforces per-user once prod passes through user token) - proposeDelete + ErpClient.deleteForm (handleType=del) + OpController branches op type; HITL-gated like update - docs/security-findings.md: report of the 5 current-system vulns (backend form-perm off, read-API-can-write, NL2SQL no-tenant/over-privilege/partial-SQL-safety/cache-skips-validation) for the business - Verified end-to-end: read after authz = 93; propose-delete card -> confirm -> row actually deleted; audit rows written.
